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It is currently fashionable among American jurisprudents to approve or
condone the selective use of legislative history in determining the meaning
of statutes. "Legislative history" in this context normally refers to
utterances (and some events) that engage the attention of the legislature
during the process, from conception to birth, of enacting the statute being
interpreted. What, specifically, legislative history consists of will appear
later in this article.' Its attractions are considerable, largely because it is
easier to read legislative history than to pick away at statutory text.
The conscientious judge searches for the "true" meaning of a statute,
because the constitutional separation of powers assigns to the legislative
branch the central responsibility for the statutory management of social
policy in the substantive areas allocated to it under the applicable
constitution, subject to such constitutional requirements as "due pro-
cess," "equal protection," definiteness, and similar guarantees of mini-
mum fairness.
Enthusiasm for legislative history usually assumes that fidelity to
legislative supremacy is best served by an unrelenting search for
legislative intent, an alleged phantom that Professor Max Radin 2 and his
many judicial and academic converts have been unsuccessful in exorcis-
ing. The concept of legislative intent is a hardy one and, however
fictional, 3 it is basic to maintaining an appropriately deferential judicial
attitude. Without it, the legislative process makes no sense.4
Many judicial pronouncements seem to imply that the fidelity owed to
legislative intent stands higher than any fidelity the court may owe to the
* Professor Emeritus of Law, Indiana University (Bloomington); author, The Interpretation
and Application of Statutes (1975); co-editor, with C. Nutting, Cases and Materials on Legislation
(1978). This article is a condensed version (published by permission) ofan article published
as part of a legislation symposium in (1983) 11 Hofstra L. Rev. 1119 et. seq. Thanks go to
Professors Michael D. Carrico, Maurice J. Holland, Michael B. W. Sinclair, and Laurel A.
Wendt for their comments and suggestions.
See infra, notes 27-39 and accompanying text.
2 Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863. Professor Radin argues
that a legislature is incapable. of having a realistic intent.
3 I doubt that the concept of legislative intent is fictional, rather than "real." See R.
Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes (1975) 73-74. This does not say that
the legislature adverts to every aspect of a statute.
4 Ibid. at 78-79.
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statute itself.5 It is well known that, because of the frailty of language and
hectic and compromising nature of the legislative process, what gets said
in a statute sometimes differs from what the moving parties intended it to
immediately accomplish. To hew to the statute in such a case, it is often
said, would be to commit the unpardonable sin of literalness, because
everyone knows that words are conditioned by the context in which they
are uttered. And who can deny that the legislative history of a statute is
part of its context, especially when one finds little in the literature to
challenge that assumption? Even so, there are gnawing doubts.
Fidelity to legislative intent is, of course, laudable, but one may ask
whether this alone is sufficient fidelity to the applicable constitution. It
seems not. Every American constitution provides, in effect, that the only
instrument by which the legislature may create law in the usual sense is a
statute enacted in the manner prescribed by that constitution. 6 The
concomitant is that fidelity to legislative supremacy can be achieved
constitutionally only if legislative meaning is pursued through a decent
rendering of the statute according to the standards of the system of
communication used by the legislative audience.
7
There is some feeling today that, in view of the legislature's conceded
inadequacies, the courts should be able to compensate by treating statute
law as if it were case law. Professor Jack Davies recently proposed
legislation to that effect, but to apply only after a statute has reached the
venerable age of 20 years.8 Although this interesting proposal is clouded
with substantive, practical, and political difficulties, it at least seeks a
legislative accommodation, however doubtful,9 with existing constitu-
tions. More typical have been rationalizations for the judicial amendment
of defective statutes that simply ignore or gloss over the constitutional
difficulties. ° For persons of this persuasion, the matters to which this
article is directed are academic trivia. But until such persons show a
better grasp of the constitutional issues, a more realistic understanding of
the legislative process, and at least a rudimentary understanding of the
principles of communication, they need not be taken seriously.
See e.g., Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., (1951) 341 U.S. 384, 390-95. For a
discussion of the use of legislative history in the interpretation of the Miller-Tydings Act in
Schwegmann, see infra, notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
6 R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 9-10.
For the four main constitutional restrictions, see ibid. at Chap. 2. These are (1) legislative
supremacy, (2) exclusiveness of statutory vehicle, (3) reliance on accepted means of
communication, and (4) reasonable availability.
See Davies, "A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act"
(1979) 4 Vermont L. Rev. 203.
9 Davies asserts that, ifa legislature can constitutionally include an automatic termination
date, it can take the less dramatic action of automatically diluting the force of the statute
upon the expiration of a prescribed period. Ibid. at 225 n. 67. Isn't this only a euphemism
for a deferred power to amend? Delegated legislation provides no precedent, because (1) it
authorizes supplementing the enabling statute, not amending it, and (2) it provides at
least rudimentary guidelines for that purpose.
10 See e.g. G. Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (1982); Note, "Intent, Clear
Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretation in the Supreme Court"
(1982) 95 Harv. L. Rev. 822.
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Persons more sensitive to the ramifications of the separation of powers,
including legislative supremacy, should take greater pains to delineate the
legitimate uses, if any, of legislative history in determining legislative
intent. But if we are to take due account of the constitutional exclusiveness
of the statutory vehicle, how can we justify the use of legislative history,
when it lies beyond the sweep of the one thing that a legislature has
constitutional power to enact? To handle this adequately, we need a
coherent theory of statutory interpretation.
After 18 years of study, I offered in The Interpretation and Application of
Statutes" a comprehensive approach to statutory interpretation that, while
satisfying some cravings,12 has created much academic disdain, because it
fitted no existing orthodoxy and used nontraditional terminology to
describe a distinction that has been strongly implied but never before
systematically exploited. In the meantime, the profession remains caught
in a semantic trap from which it is apparently unable to extricate itself.
Although it is widely recognized that in taking account of statutes
courts have not only a law-finding function ("interpretation" in its
conventional non-legal sense) but, in cases where the law so found is
inadequate to dispose of the case before it, a law-making 3 function that
engrafts on the statute meaning appropriate to resolving the controversy,
the implications of this are not generally appreciated. The distinction is
fundamental, because the two elements differ widely and are governed by
two disparate sets of principles.14
The former element, for which I borrowed Professor Alf Ross's term
'cognitive,"" is controlled for the most part by general, extra-legal
principles of communication. The latter, for which I have used the term
"creative," is essentially controlled by constitutional principles. The
current confusion of doctrine respecting "statutory interpretation" results
from legal theoreticians' use of the single term indiscriminately to cover
two functions that not only differ radically but should, for constitutional
reasons relating to the separation of powers and unfair surprise, be
performed, not simultaneously, but serially.
16
This long recognized distinction and the constitutional exclusiveness of
the statutory vehicle must be conscientiously respected if we are to make
practical and constitutional sense out of the grab bag of materials that
goes under the name "legislative history," irreverently referred to by
" R. Dickerson, supra, note 3.
12 See, e.g., Donahue, "Limitations on Judicial Review: A Semiotic Interpretation of
Statutes", (1978) 7 U.C.L.A.-Alaska L. Rev. 204; Williams, "Statutes as Sources of Law
Beyond Their Terms in Common-Law Cases, (1982) 50 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 554; Re,
Book Review, (1977) 22 N.Y.L. Rev. 1092 (reviewing R. Dickerson, The Interpretation and
Application of Statutes (1975).
13 For a list of articles discussing this "law-making" function, see R. Dickerson, supra, note 3,
at 14 n. 5; see also W. Statsky, Legislative Analysis: How to Use Statutes and Regulations (1975)
23-24.
1 R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 13-33 ("Basic Concepts: The Ascertainment of Meaning
(Cognition) and Judicial Lawmaking Through the Assignment of Meaning (Creation)").
'5 A. Ross, On Law and Justice (1959) 138.
IS R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 20, 190.
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Charles P. Curtis as "the ashcans of the legislative process."' 17 Resistance
to the distinction between a court's cognitive and its creative functions is
often voiced in terms of the alleged impossibility of intellectually
separating from each other notions that are functionally intertwined, a
purported handicap that rings oddly in the ears of those who realize that
doingjust that has long been a main preoccupation of the courts.
My own views can be summarized quickly. 8 While performing its
cognitive function of finding statutory meaning, courts should defer to
legislative history only to the extent, if any, that it can be considered part
of the external context 19 of the statute, it being no part of the statute itself.
This is easier said than done, because there are strong doubts that much,
if any, legislative history is properly regarded as context.
Where the statutory meaning so found is inadequate to decide the case,
courts are free, and indeed are required, to attribute to the statute
judge-made meaning appropriate under the legal standards for making
law where the statute fails (its creative function). Unfortunately, the
indiscriminate lumping of these two judicial functions under the name
"statutory interpretation" has stunted the doctrinal growth of both.20
Indeed, with respect to statutes I perceive no currently accepted body of
doctrine for judicial law making.
It is not my purpose here to develop such a body of doctrine, beyond
pointing out that there are at least 10 possible guides to supplemental
judicial law making in administering statutes 2 1 and that with respect to
them the concept of legislative intent plays a more modest role. For this
reason, the need to discover it, with or without resort to legislative history,
is likely to be less. Indeed, there should be little or no restriction on what
the court may look at for this purpose. The most serious problem here is to
determine whether the judicial enhancement of the statute involves the
threat of unfairly surprising the legislative audience, 22 a risk that can be
avoided by deferring the effectiveness of the new legal meaning.
23
Conversely, unfair surprise is no problem for the cognitive function so
long as nothing is attributed to the statute that is not revealed by the text
as it is conditioned by its total context.
Although the cognitive-creative dichotomy (and sequence) has not been
adopted by the judiciary in those terms, it has been strongly implied by
the many courts that resort to legislative history only when significant
uncertainty of the statutory meaning emerges. Unfortunately, the
implication is blurred by the willingness of some courts to accept
legislative history as the sole source of the uncertainty. Rather, notions of
fairness would seem to require that factors creating uncertainty should not
''C. Curtis, It's Your Law (1954) 52.
8 For a more detailed treatment, see R. Dickerson, supra, note 3. at 137-97 ("The Uses and
Abuses of Legislative History").
See infra, text accompanying notes 24-25.
"(13 R. Pound,Jusprudence (1959) 483-84.
2, R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 240-61.
22 For a discussion of identifying legislative audiences, see W. Statsky, supra, note 13, at
83-98.
,3 R. Dickerson, supra. note 3. at 257-61.
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be the basis for upsetting otherwise clear language-in-context, unless
those factors are part of context and thus available to the legislative
audience.
Because some extrinsic evidence lies within the statutory context and
some lies outside, it is important to understand the qualifications for
external context. I suggest four 24: Extrinsic material must be (1) relevant;
(2) reliable and reliably revealed; (3) reasonably available to the audience
(that is, shared by author and audience); (4) taken into account (that is,
relied on), as constituting part of the communication, by both- author and
audience.
25
In general, little legislative history is helpfully relevant. Much of it is
unreliable or unreliably revealed. Most if not all of it is of questionable
practical availability to typical members of the legislative audience.
Besides, little or none of it is relied on by typical members of the legislative
audience as conditioning the language of the statute.
The reader should keep in mind that whether something is part of the
external context of a statute is relevant to the court's cognitive function,
not its creative function. The reader should also consider what the
material is being used to show. On the one hand, material that purports to
state what the statute means (which is congruent with immediate
purpose) should be rejected out of hand, because it competes with the
statute and, if used, undermines the court's role of having the final say on
what statutes-in-context mean. On the other hand, material that states
what the statute is ulteriorly (more broadly or remotely) attempting to
accomplish is not similarly offensive, however objectionable it may be on
other grounds. 26 With these general guidelines, let us now see how
particular kinds of legislative history measure up.
Kinds of Legislative History
Recommendations of a Study Group
Many statutes are the culmination of studies by official bodies charged
with finding legislative solutions to social problems. 27 The resulting
reports are the most reliable type of evidence of legislative intent so far as
the intent can be inferred from the ulterior purposes of the statute
disclosed by the study. These purposes are relevant, however, only so far
as it is probable that what the legislature enacted in the particular case
was directed at the same purposes as those disclosed by the report. In
each case, some deviation is highly probable. How to determine it is the
problem.
24 For a more detailed discussion of external context, see R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at
105-25, 142-62.
2' All but item (4) have received some recognition in England. See, e.g. Samuels, "The
Interpretation of Statutes", [1980] Stat. L. Rev. 86, 95.
2' R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 87-88, 156-57.
27 For further discussion of the legislative history generated by study groups, see ibid. at
161-62, 166-67, 196.
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Another problem is practical availability. Unless the statute or its
official publication refers to the report, it would be asking too much of
typical members of the legislative audience to take into account the
purposes stated in the report unless they were independently a part of the
background knowledge, however supplied, common to that audience.
English courts, which tend to reject all legislative history, cite the reports
of Royal Commissions and similar bodies, but only to affirm legislative
purposes.28 If those purposes are independently revealed by knowledge
otherwise a part of the legislative context, or if the report is used in making
law to resolve an otherwise unresolvable uncertainty, that approach
makes sense. Otherwise, such a report should not be relied on for
cognitive purposes, unless the statute specifically refers to it.
The same considerations would seem to apply to executive communica-
tions recommending legislation.
Committee Hearings
It is highly doubtful that committee hearings can qualify as external
context. What is said at such hearings is so unreliable, even when it
appears to make good sense, that courts should pay little heed to it,
29
except possibly for confirmatory purposes. It tends to be highly
adversarial, but without even the elementary safeguards for balance that
our judicial system provides. As for witnesses, the cards are likely to be
heavily stacked in favour of the proponents of the bill. There are few




Committee reports are the second most reliable kind of legislative
history. 32 Their main value is in showing (if they do) the ulterior purposes
that the respective bills are intended to advance. Here, they tend to
emphasise the main thrusts of the legislation, which are usually not too
hard to infer from general context.
By long-standing practice, most congressional committee reports
include sectional analyses. Unfortunately, these usually consist of mere
paraphrases of the statute, and the deviations from statutory text are not
likely to be reliably helpful. Although the best person to write the
paraphrase is normally the one who drafted the statute, the opportunity to
28 See R. Cross, Statutory Interpretation (1976) 136-39. For reasons given for rejecting British
legislative history, see Samuels, "The Interpretation of Statutes: No Change", (1982) 79
L.S. Gaz. 1252-53.
9 R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 155-57. For the most part, unreliability results from bias
and from the imbalance inherent in the inevitably incomplete and sporadic nature ofwhat
is express, practically available, and otherwise reliable. Many critical legislative
developments are off-stage, carefully shielded from the public eye.
30 Ibid. at 148-49.
31 Ibid. at 145-47.
32 However, even these reports are unreliable so far as they try to state the meaning of what
is being recommended for enactment. See supra, text accompanying note 26.
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get the paraphrase right is likely to be even poorer than the opportunity to
get the statute right. Even worse, paraphrases are inevitably competing
statements of legislative intent rather than statements of specific ulterior
purposes. Nor are there adequate guarantees of objectivity.
Practical availability is also a problem. Even conference reports, each
reflecting a consensus following disagreement between two houses, are not
free from these defects.
33
Floor Debates
Among the least reliable kinds of legislative history are floor debates.
34
Not only are they laden with sales talk, but their frequent reference to
what a provision means is an unconscious effort to finesse the courts in
performing their constitutional function of having the last word on what
the statute means. Besides, it would be rare for the authors of a statute to
take such references into account.
Even where floor debate is directed to ulterior purposes, the problem of
bias persists. Indeed, there are even fewer restraints on insincerity,
because the disciplines of the legislative process bear less heavily on the
motives for legislative action than they do on the legislative action itself.
Reliability is further undermined by the widespread practice, at least in
Congress, of allowing legislators to amend or supplement their remarks in
the published version in the Congressional Record. "As it goes into the Record,
House debate is thus a curious melange of the opening lines of many
speeches never heard on the floor, coupled with revised, sometimes totally
new, remarks. ... [M]embers in both houses rearrange the facts and
rewrite bits and chunks of historical record.
35
It is thus doubtful that much, if any, floor debate, other than statements
by the manager of the bill, is useful even for confirmatory purposes.
Besides, even with publication, practical availability remains a problem.
Adoption, Non-Adoption, or Rejection of Interim Amendments
Although often relied on by courts in interpreting or applying statutes, the
adoption, non-adoption, or rejection of an amendment proposed during
the course of enactment, standing alone, is normally an ambiguous and
therefore neutral circumstance.3 The reason is simple. Any of these
actions may result from disparate purposes on which it is hard, if not
impossible, to ascertain legislative consensus.
Even if the proposed amendment is adopted, it may have been intended
to change substance or it may have been intended merely to clarify the
language. If it is rejected, the range of possibilities is much wider. It may
be rejected by some legislators because they disagree with its substance
" R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 145, 147, 196.
14 For a general discussion of floor debates, see ibid. at 145, 147, 155-57, 185-87, 191, 195,
-267.
s W. Keefe and M. Ogul, The American Legislative Process (5th ed. 1981) 258, (footnote
omitted).
36 R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 160-61.
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(but not necessarily the same substance). On the other hand, those who
agree with the substance may nevertheless vote against it as a spurious or
unnecessary attempt to clarify. Simple non-action, being consistent with
many explanations in circumstances not calling for consensus, has no
probative value for any purpose.
Where such ambiguities tend to be resolved by other circumstances,
they should not be considered for the purposes of cognition, unless they,
too, meet the standards of external context.3 7 Otherwise, the court must
cope with the risk of unfair surprise.
Miscellaneous
Post-enactment developments should be disregarded for purposes of
cognition, simply because at enactment they were taken into account by
neither the authors of the statute nor its audience. 38 The problems of
relevance, reliability, and availability also persist, often in greater degree,
even where they relate only to ulterior purpose.
Official executive pronouncements at the time of signing are rare so far
as legislative intent and ulterior purposes are concerned. When made,
these cannot be brushed aside as post-enactment commentary, however,
because the chief executive officer is himself part of the enactment process.
Can the President's views on ulterior purpose be attributed to Congress?
The question raises no greater theoretical difficulty than arises for
statements made by the second house, which could hardly have been
within the contemplation of the first house unless the bill went to
conference. The problems in both instances are those of reliability and
availability: How probable is it, in the circumstances, that the recited
purposes also motivated the earlier legislative participants? Assuming
reliability, are such statements sufficiently available and relied on to be
part of context? Probably not.
Statements on the witness stand by a legislator or draftsman, 3 9 even
when confined to ulterior legislative purpose, cannot, under any theory,
be part of legislative context. Indeed, such statements are not even part of
legislative history, however much they deal substantively with the
enactment of the statute. So far as they purport to declare the meaning of
the statute, they compete with the statute. Also, they are highly
unreliable.
Judicial Use of Legislative History
A Partial Concession: Confirmatory Use
While it seems clear that few, if any, aspects of legislative history are part
of proper legislative context and that all the rest can, in constitutional
principle, be disregarded for purposes of cognition, there is a widespread
practice among judges, even in England (where it is usually covert), to
31 See supra, text accompanying notes 24-25.
3' R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 179-183.
" R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 156 n. 49.
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consult materials of legislative history during the cognitive phase.4 0
Shortly before his retirement from the bench, Chief Judge Charles D.
Breitel of the New York Court of Appeals, wrote me as follows respecting
The Interpretation and Application of Statutes:
"I found the chapter on the abuses and uses of legislative history the
most valuable just because it is the area most misunderstood by
judges, lawyers, and students of the subject. I have small disagree-
ments, of course, but they are only small.
At page 139 you emphasize, as is so often done with the parol
evidence rule, that one confine oneself to beginning with textual
language. That does not happen, and it is not required to happen
that way. One always looks to extrinsic material either to discover
meaning, to confirm meaning, or to elaborate on meaning. The parol
evidence rule and the statutory rule do come into play only when the
extrinsic material tends to contradict or vary the meaning deter-
mined literally or in context. I think this examination of extrinsic
material is a good practice. But even if it were not, the fact is the
practice is about as universal in every instance in which a court says
that it is excluding the extrinsic material either in the contractual or
statutory interpretation case. It has in fact first looked at the
material. At the paragraph that begins at the very bottom of page 146
and concludes at the top of page 147, analytically you ought to be
right. The fact of the matter is, however, that if there is any leeway,
deference of some kind will be paid to comments that are literally
described as "official", albeit not in a constitutional sense. It is not
law, as you say, but it surely plays a role as a source if there is any
kind of leeway."
41
Because this analysis is realistic in recognising the widespread
psychological need for reassurance in hard cases, it makes sense not to
deny the court the opportunity to look for confirmation of an interpreta-
tion otherwise made probable by text and context, even if confirmation
takes it beyond what is also available to the legislative audience. The
crucial constitutional safeguard lies of Judge Breitel's statement that
rejection is required "when the extrinsic material tends to contradict or
vary the meaning determined literally or in context.",42 In other words, it
may be used to support, but not to overturn, meaning-in-context. On the
other hand, his requirement of "leeway" implies the guarantee that
judicial law making will be deferred until cognition establishes an area of
otherwise unresolvable uncertainty. Acceptance oi" Lord Renton's belief
that legislative history should not be cited in court43 would help prevent
confirmatory use from becoming abuse.
A striking example of the use of legislative history for confirmatory
purposes appears in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Schwegmann Bros.
40 Ibid. at 163-64, 189, 195-96.
"' Letter from ChiefJudge Charles D. Breitel to F. Reed Dickerson (August 21, 1978).
42 Ibid.
' Renton, "Interpretation of Legislation", [1982] Stat. L. Rev. 7, 9; see also R. Dickerson,
supra, note 3, at 196 (court consultation oflegislative history should not be mentioned in
opinions).
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v. Calvert Distillers Corp.' Here, the court held that the Miller-Tydings
Act, which expressly exempted from the Sherman Act vertical agreements
setting minimum prices for resale of specified commodities (where such
agreements were lawful under local state law), did not result in validating
state non-signer provisions that extended the force of minimum price
fixing agreements horizontally to keep competing retailers in line.
4 5
Selected statements from legislative history provided the majority with
apparent support for its belief that, by omitting reference to the horizontal
aspects of resale price maintenance, Congress intended to preserve to that
extent the prohibitions of the Sherman Act. 4 6 What it overlooked was that
validation of the vertical aspects would not work without validation of the
horizontal. It also missed Frankfurter's perception that Congress did not
need to affirmatively validate state non-signer provisions but merely
needed to nullify the legal force that had indirectly struck them down in
the first place-the Sherman Act's invalidation of the vertical consentual
arrangements upon which the non-consentual horizontal restraints on
competing retailers depended, under state law, for their validity.
47
Frankfurter's appreciation of the indirect force of the statute kept the
statutory remedy coextensive with the statutory need, fulfilled the
legislative purpose of providing a workable validation of vertical price
fixing, and was fully consistent with the wording of the statute, all this
being supportable without going beyond the total statutory scheme. As for
legislative history, it happened in this instance to confirm Frankfurter's
perception at every point 48 (even the legislative history cited by the
majority fell into line). The majority, on the other hand, misread the
extent of the statutory need and drew a false inference from Congress's
decision to omit non-signer clauses (even though inclusion would have
been superfluous). As for confirmation, the majority had to disregard part
of the legislative history. It might better have disregarded all of it.
The case seems to support the recommendation of Professor Henry M.
Hart, Jr., that a court should hold off looking at legislative history until an
examination of the statute in context has generated a problem of
meaning.49 Indeed, the majority's failure in Schwegmann to fully grasp
what needed legislative attention may have resulted from a premature
examination of legislative history.
Because legislative history in this instance consistently confirmed
Frankfurter's independently supportable position, it is ironical that Mr.
JusticeJackson, long an impassioned enemy of legislative history, selected
14 (1951) 341 U.S. 384, 397-411. See also R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 162 n. 63 (discussing
the use of legislative history and the Frankfurter approach to this case).
341 U.S. at 389.
'"Ibid, at 390-95.
4 See ibid. at 397 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
1 Ibid. at 398-401.
9 H. Hart, Jr., "Tentative Restatement of the Law" (prepared for the 1953 meeting of the
Association of American Law Schools, reprinted in F. Newman and S. Surrey,
Legislation-Cases and Materials (1955) 669, 670; see also R. Dickerson, supra, note 3, at 141
(discussing the Hart scheme). It is not clear, however, whether this scheme was meant to
apply to a court's cognitive function or its creative function.
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this as the occasion for one of his strongest diatribes against its use. 50
Despite the cogency of Jackson's general points, Frankfurter cannot be
faulted for a reading that was fully supported by the statute-in-context
(and therefore adequately accessible to the legislative audience) and for
confirming it by looking at the legislative history. It would have been
better if Frankfurter had not referred to that legislative history in his
opinion.
Current State ofjudicial Doctrine
A sampling of the cases suggests that most courts tend to conform to the
approach previously outlined by deferring the use of legislative history
until significant uncertainty is otherwise established. 51 This might seem to
imply that, after shunning legislative history for purposes of cognition,
courts are willing to consult it only for purposes ofjudicial law making.
Unfortunately, the constitutionally implied dividing line between
judicial cognition and judicial creation is not the simple line between
certainty of meaning and uncertainty of meaning, but rather the line
between them as drawn after the court has exhausted the resources of text
and context. Mere uncertainty is not enough, because much initial
uncertainty is only apparent, disappearing when the resources of
meaning, which exclude matters falling outside total context, have been
more fully-evaluated. Onlythen has the court discharged its responsibility
to total context and thus-to leki-slative supremacy. Unfortunately, it is
hard, if not impossible, after the fact to determine in which instances the
courts' consultation of legislative history was premature. The implications
ofjudicial support are correspondingly weakened.
On the other hand, it must be clear that this article is not based on the
specifics of case law. As the Canadian courts have discovered,5 2 case law
in this area tends to be relevant only for the meaning of the statutes
respectively involved, because the specifics of meaning are usually unique.
As for legitimate across-the-board legal principles, few exist. The domain
of cognition is for the most part the domain of general principles of
meaning and communication, not principles of law.
The vast literature of case doctrine in the field of "statutory
interpretation" is fragmentary, chaotic, and unrelatable consistently to
either the basics of meaning theory or accepted principles of constitutional
law. These complaints include the uses of legislative history, which cannot
be reconciled on the basis of any rational theory expressed by existing case
law.
[To be continued]
50 341 U.S. at 395 (Jackson, J. concurring).
s' SeeJ. Hurst, Dealing With Statutes (1982) 53, 55-56.
52 See, e.g., E. Driedger, The Construction of Statutes vii-viii (1974).
